The Legal Implications of Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong

In criminal law, lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is a mitigating circumstance that can be used to reduce the severity of punishment for an accused. This concept is based on the belief that an individual should not be held responsible for his or her actions if they did not intend to commit such a serious offence.

It is also important to note that this mitigating circumstance does not excuse the accused from any liability, but rather reduces the punishment they will receive. The courts will consider all relevant factors in determining whether or not this mitigating circumstance applies in a particular case.

“Mitigating circumstances” do not provide a justification or excuse for the offense at hand, but they may be seen as mitigating or decreasing the degree of moral blame in justice and mercy. The mitigating factor that the criminal had no intention of doing such a grievous wrong as that committed, also known as praeter intentionem, occurs when there is a significant gap between the accused’s means of doing wrong and the resulting offense committed.”

The Law | Lack of Intent to Commit so Grave a Wrong

Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:¹

“x x x x . . . . x x x x . . . .

“Paragraph 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.²

“x x x x . . . . x x x x . . . .

What bad it makes?

Normally, when one does an unlawful act, the same may be traced on the author’s intention. This is otherwise known as the mens rea. However, there may be instances where the consequences of an unlawful act is greater than the offender’s actual intention. For instance, the culprit just what to injure his adversary. Instead of merely causing physical injury, the perpetrator killed his victim.

Intention may be ascertained by considering:

• The weapon used
• The part of the body injured
• The injury inflicted
• The manner it is inflicted

The external acts of the offender demonstrate intent as a mental process, and are judged by facts demonstrating notable disproportion between the means employed, its consequences, and the attendant circumstances, such as the nature and type of weapon used, the location of the wound inflicted, the number of wounds, and the accused’s conduct at the time of its commission. Thus:

This mitigating circumstance requires in order that it may legally be applied that the evil produced should not be disproportionate neither to the intensity of the means employed to execute it, nor to the efficacy of the implement used to commit it. (Decision of August 10, 1900.)³

The lack of intention to cause so serious an evil as that produced, can only be considered in default of facts which may clearly show it when there is such a disproportion between the resultant evil and the means employed to cause it, so that the evil could not reasonably be presumed. (Decision of March 22, 1901.)⁴

Circumstance No. 3 of article 9 can only be considered when the facts proven show that there exists notable and evident disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequence. (Decision of January 29, 1902.)⁴

What is Praeter Intentionem?

Praeter intentionem simply means unintentionally. It is the absence of intent, albeit, that allows such a serious wrong to be committed. The intended victim gets injured, but the effects are substantially worse than what was intended. That happens when someone had planned to do something unpleasant, but his actions turned out to be even worse.

In Praeter Intentionem, a person is criminally accountable for committing an intended offense, even if the unintended outcome is more serious than the intended. It is critical to highlight that there must be a significant gap between the means utilized and the offense committed.

Relevant Jurisprudence

In People vs. Ural,⁵ the mitigating circumstance “that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed” [Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code] was appreciated.

“It is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design being only to maltreat him, may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. Such that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.⁶

“Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64 par 4 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code).⁶

Means used logically and naturally result in the actual offense

To illustrate hypothetically, A wanted to inflict physical injuries on B. A fatally hacked B with a bolo, which resulted in B’s death. There is no case of praeter intentionem because the means that were used would definitely and rationally result in A’s demise.

Now to illustrate using well-decided jurisprudence:

In the case of People vs. Amit,⁷ the Supreme Court held that the lack of intention to commit such a grave wrong as that committed cannot be appreciated in favor of an accused who used brute force — choking a girl to death, trying to shout while raping her — intention being gathered from and determined solely by the offender’s conduct and external acts, as well as the results of the acts themselves.

Absence of intent to perpetrate such a terrible wrong as the one actually committed must, by definition, be considered in light of the acts committed by him and the circumstances in which they are committed.

If they demonstrate a significant disparity between the means used to commit the criminal act, on the one hand, and the consequences, on the other, the mitigating factor must be regarded in favor of the accused.

“At the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was 32 years of age, while his victim was 25 years his senior, and when the latter resisted his attempt to rape her by biting and scratching him, to subdue her, the accused boxed her and then held her on the neck and pressed it down, while she was lying on her back and he was on top of her, these acts were reasonably sufficient to produce the result that they actually produced the death of the victim.”⁸

Here’s another, the case of People vs. Retubado,⁹ negated the appreciation of praeter intentionem.

The accused cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. He ought to have known that boxing a 5-month old child twice with the full force of his clenched fists would necessarily result in great physical harm to the child or even his death. Clearly, brute force was employed by the accused.¹⁰

As has been repeatedly ruled by the High Court, praeter intentionem does not apply if the means taken to achieve the planned crime would likewise logically and naturally result in the actual offense.

Final Thoughts

To recap, praeter intentionem is a mitigating factor, which is specifically addressed in paragraph 3 or Article 13. It is important to note that in order to qualify as mitigating, there must be a sufficient gap between the accused’s methods of doing wrong and the resulting offense committed.

To summarize, intent as a mental process is demonstrated by the offender’s external acts and is judged by facts demonstrating notable disproportion between the means employed, its consequences, and the attendant circumstances, such as the nature and type of weapon used, the location of the wound inflicted, the number of wounds, and the accused’s conduct at the time of its commission.

It should be understood that these mitigating circumstances do not provide a justification or excuse for the offense at hand, but be construed as moderating or lessening the degree of moral blame in justice and mercy.

1. Article 13, Paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code[↩]
2. Id.[↩]
3. United States vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 12635, September 25, 1917[↩]
4. Ibid.[↩][↩]
5. G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974[↩]
6. Ibid.[↩][↩]
7. G.R. No. L-29066, March 25, 1970[↩]
8. Ibid.[↩]
9. G.R. No. L-58585 June 20, 1988[↩]
10. Ibid.[↩]