Fulfillment of Duty in Criminal Law | What is Article 11, Par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code?

We will discuss Fulfillment of Duty in Criminal Law. One of the fundamental things you need to know in studying criminal law is the criminal liability of the accused. You might find yourself wondering, is this person criminally liable? Can this be considered self-defense? This is why it is important to distinguish and to fully grasp the concepts of circumstances affecting criminal liability.

In concept, when we talk about justifying circumstances, we discuss these circumstances where the act is in accordance with law. Hence, the ‘accused’ here may have sustained no criminal liability as consequences for the said act. His act is not criminal, there lacks criminal intent. Thus, there is no crime, and there is no civil liability either.

Interestingly, it must be noted, as well, that in cases where the accused invokes justifying circumstance, the burden of proof is shifted to the accused who must prove that he is innocent. This is in relation to the maxim: “El incombit probotion qui decit non qui negat — He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.”

Justifying circumstances are stated in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. They are enumerated as:

1. self-defense;
2. defense of relatives;
3. defense of strangers;
4. state of necessity;
5. fulfillment of duty; and
6. obedience to superior order.

What are the elements of fulfillment of a duty in criminal law?

Specifically, in Article 11, par. 5, it states that:

“Article 11. Justifying circumstances – The following do not incur criminal liability:¹

xx

5] Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.”²

In fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office, the elements are the following:

• That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office;
• The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

The first element provides that the accused, at the time of the commission of the offense, is acting in the fulfillment of his duty. The accused here must also prove that he was duly appointed to the duty he was discharging when he committed the offense. He must also prove that he has not exceeded in the fulfillment of his duty.

The second element, on the other hand, the accused must prove that the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty and thus, cannot be avoided.

What has been decided

An illustrative example of this justifying circumstance – in the fulfillment of duty where both elements are present, can be seen in the case of People vs. De Lima – the policeman, Felipe De Lima found Lorenzo Napilon who escaped from jail and demanded his surrender.

Napilon, instead of doing so, attacked De Lima with a piece of bamboo, but the latter dodged it. Napilon ran away without parting with his weapon. De Lima went after him and again fired against him, this time hitting and killing him. The Court here held that:

“That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which although it prove to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.”³

To put it simply, a person, even though his act resulted to injury, but it is in the fulfillment of his duty, his act is justified and will not incur any criminal liability.

However, what if one of the elements is not present? Will that still justify the act?

In the case of People vs. Oanis,⁴ appellants Oanis and Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal, Balagtas, dead or alive. Upon arriving at his whereabouts, defendants simultaneously fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.

It was later revealed that the person who was shot and killed was not Balagtas, but a peaceful and innocent citizen. The appellants were found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide by the trial court. They claimed that because they acted in the honest performance of their official duties, both believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incurred no criminal liability.

The court however ruled here that:

“Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612).⁵

“The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: “No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.” (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109).⁵

“It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).”⁵

In the case of Mamangun vs. People,⁶ the court held that:

“To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man.⁷

“However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.⁷

There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras who was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.”⁷

Furthermore, it was also held in the case of People vs. Ulep:⁸

“The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed.⁹

“However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law.⁹

“We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights.”⁹

Final Thoughts

Having these cases as illustrative example, it must be emphasized that in order to be relieved from criminal liability invoking justifying circumstance, all elements should be present. The absence of one will make the accused liable for the offense with a privileged mitigating circumstance to reduce the penalty. Also, as mentioned in the case of People vs. Ulep that in the fulfillment duty, killing should be used as the last resort, and the accused should exercise his duty within reasonable limits.

To sum it up, in order for the accused to invoke justifying circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 11, 1.) he must be acting in the fulfillment of his duty and the 2.) injury caused must be a necessary consequence of the due performance of his fulfillment of duty. The burden of proof must be satisfactorily established that these two elements are present, thus the accused is justified in causing injury to the victim.

1. Article 11 (5), Revised Penal Code[↩]
2. Id.[↩]
3. People vs. Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, December 22, 1922[↩]
4. G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943[↩]
5. Ibid.[↩][↩][↩]
6. G.R. No. 149152, February 2, 2007[↩]
7. Ibid.[↩][↩][↩]
8. G.R. No. 132547, September 20, 2000[↩]
9. Ibid.[↩][↩][↩]